Deterring the State Versus the Firm: Soft and Hard Deterrence Regimes in EU Law by Petit, Nicolas & Bogojević, Sanja
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2774875 
 
1
Deterring the State versus the Firm: Soft and Hard Deterrence Regimes in EU Law  
Sanja Bogojević and Nicolas Petit*  
Abstract: This paper sheds light on the existence of a differential deterrence regime in EU law, depending on 
whether the State or the firm is the addressee of a legal obligation. To that end, we review two areas of EU law – 
environmental law and competition law. Both disciplines employ fines to deter the State and the firm respectively 
from violating their specific duties under the Treaty: the ’duty to transpose’ with regard to State obligation under 
environmental law, and the ‘duty to compete’ in relation to firms under competition law. We show how the 
deterrence regime is softer on the State in at least three ways: functionally (purpose ascribed to the penalties), 
operationally (method followed to set and liquidate the penalty), and procedurally (requiring prior judicial approval 
as opposed to having immediate applicability). These findings are significant for two reasons: they suggest a State 
versus firm discrepancy in the EU’s deterrence regime, and serve to initiate a debate on the desirability of such a 
divide.   
 
1. Introduction 
At a stylized level, European Union (‘EU’) policies transversally impose obligations on two types 
of economic agents: the State and the firm. Yet, the systems of penalties used to deter violations 
of EU law by the State and the firm markedly diverge.1 Our study shows that when the State is 
the addressee, the system of deterrence is softer, be it functionally (purpose ascribed to the 
penalties), operationally (method followed to set the penalty), and procedurally (requiring prior 
judicial approval as opposed to immediate applicability). In contrast, under all similar counts, the 
firm is under a harder deterrence regime.  
Over and above the key objective of showing that soft and hard deterrence regimes exist in 
EU law, this paper advances the somewhat controversial idea that such divergence between 
deterring the State and the firm may need a rethink. Whilst it is true that the State and the firm 
does not respond equally to incentives due to a variety of reasons outlined later in this study, it 
remains that both the State and the firm are, to a given extent, social organisations that respond 
to utility functions. What is more, the market discipline, to which firms are exposed, is a source 
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1 Schwarze notes that ‘Sanctions are a major policy instrument in the European Community’, see J. Schwarze, 
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of powerful deterrence incentives to which the State is not subject. As explained by Ronald 
Coase, although Government may be seen as a ‘super-firm’, it is not subject to checks in its 
operations as is the firm but is instead able, if it wishes, ‘to avoid the market altogether, which a 
firm can never do.’2 This may be seen as calling for harder, not softer deterrence on the State. 
Whilst we fall short of reaching this conclusion, we nonetheless argue that this perspective invites 
further thinking on deterrence as applied vis-à-vis the State and on a requalification of the two-
tier deterrence regime observed in the EU.  
This is undoubtedly an ambitious paper, underpinned by broader questions of optimal 
enforcement of law on which there is no scholarly consensus. Moreover, deterrence is not the 
whole and sole enforcement strategy, and we recognise that many other effective strategies can 
be used by regulators to enforce the law.3 That said, the ambition of this paper is not to discuss 
the pros and cons of optimal deterrence as a law enforcement strategy, but instead to illustrate 
and also better understand why, within the positive deterrence system followed in EU law, two 
distinct regimes co-exist depending on who the addressee of the legal obligation is. In this 
context, we acknowledge the explanatory force of the EU’s institutional design, which means that 
soft deterrence may not be a deliberate strategy but is to some extent endogenous to the way that 
the EU is constructed and operates. This may indeed create certain challenges in proposing 
revisions of the current system but it also makes the case for a rethink of the State/firm 
distinction.    
Our analytical framework reviews deterrence policy in two specific areas of EU law: 
environmental law and competition law. At a conceptual level, both disciplines employ fines to 
                                                     
2 R. Coase, The Firm, the Market and the Law (University of Chicago Press 1990) 117. For an introduction, see U. 
Pagano, ‘Public Markets, Private Orderings and Corporate Governance’, (2000) 20 International Review of Law and 
Economics 453–477. 
3 For instance, and in the view of Gunningham, different intervention strategies – deterrence being one of them –  
ought to be applied in enforcing environmental law, see N. Gunningham, 'Enforcing Environmental Regulation' 
(2011) 23 Journal of Environmental Law 169, 194. More generally, Ayres and Braithwaite discuss a pyramid of 
enforcement strategies including persuasion, warning letters, enforcement notice, administrative penalties, criminal 
prosecution, license suspension and revocation, see I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending 
the Deregulation Debate (Oxford University Press 1992). 
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respectively deter the State and the firm from violating their respective duties under the Treaty: 
the ‘duty to transpose’ with regard to State obligations under environmental law, and the ‘duty to 
compete’ in relation to firms under competition law.4 By resorting to fines, both sets of legal rules 
ultimately seek to avert sources of serious harm: environmental and consumer harm. As such, 
they constitute useful comparators. We study in particular how the Commission and the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) interpret and impose financial sanctions on the State and 
firms in this context, focusing on enforcement actions brought by the Commission under Article 
260 Treaty of the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) and Regulation 1/2003 respectively.5  
We certainly appreciate that Article 260 TFEU is applicable in all areas of EU law and is, as 
such, not an enforcement mechanism specific to environmental law. Similarly, we acknowledge 
that environmental law delegates significant enforcement responsibility to private law remedies 
and Member States’ authorities, which are not covered in this study.6 That said, we study how the 
State is deterred under Article 260 TFEU through the lenses of environmental law for two main 
reasons.  
First, Article 260 TFEU is the only judicial remedy that can be used to financially sanction 
States for violations of their duty to transpose under the Treaties. It is for this reason, and not so 
as to argue that environmental law is only concerned with state action or public law7 that we 
focus on this particular provision. Second, almost half of the existing case law on Article 260 
TFEU deals with environmental law, and more precisely, with the failure of a Member State to 
transpose an environmental directive following a Court judgment under Article 258 TFEU, or to 
                                                     
4 The treaty talks of ‘undertakings’ to refer to organs that carry out an ‘economic activity’. From a conceptual 
standpoint, however, the notion of firm can be used as a synonym for undertaking. 
5 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (2003) L1/1, based on Articles 192(4), 101 and 102 TFEU.  
6 For a detailed overview, see M. Hedemann-Robinson, Enforcement of European Union Environmental Law: Legal Issues 
and Challenges (2 edn, Routledge 2015). In particular, the EU Environmental Liability, for instance, is another 
important instrument that is for the Member States to use in enabling direct civil claims by private parties against 
polluters, see L. Bergkamp and B. Goldsmith (eds), The EU Environmental Liability Directive: A Commentary (Oxford 
University Press 2013).      
7 Market/state dichotomy in this regard is challenged in S. Bogojević, Emissions Trading Schemes: Markets, States and 
Law (Hart Publishing 2013) chapter 6.  
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communicate to the Commission the measures adopted to transpose an environmental directive.8 
Environmental law thus seems to constitute a useful and representative vantage point to study 
the sanctions imposed to deter States from violating their duty to transpose.  
Our framework focuses exclusively on financial penalties,9 which, in line with deterrence 
theory, are the primary devices to unconditionally deter breaches of the law.10 In contrast, we do 
not explore liability in tort as a possible deterrence device. In the literature, the objectives of tort 
liability have been said to remain a ‘mystery’, and deterrence is often described as a tangential 
objective of liability remedies.11 Moreover, in practice, the empirical potential of liability remedies 
to ensure deterrence in environmental and competition law is limited.12 In so far as Member 
States liability under Francovich is concerned, the track record of Member States non-transposition 
prior to the adoption of Article 260 TFEU empirically shows that liability remedies are 
ineffective at deterring breaches of the duty to transpose, and are at best a compensatory 
mechanism. In so far as firm liability for breaches of the duty to compete is concerned, it ought 
to be recalled that competition law infringements are often secret, thus making victim 
enforcement remedies ever inapt to deter.13  
Finally, it should be noted that we use the generic concepts of State and firm to denote 
respectively for all State-related organizations on the one hand, and for all undertakings, which 
                                                     
8 See Section 2.  
9 Financial sanctions and fines are terms used interchangeably in this text, for a similar approach see C. Abbot, 
Enforcing Pollution Control Regulation: Strengthening Sanctions and Improving Deterrence (Hart Publishing 2009) 10.  
10 This approach is further explained in Section 6, focusing on Becker’s seminal work on deterrence, see G. Becker, 
'Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach' in Gary Becker and William Landes (eds), Essays in the Economics of 
Crime and Punishment (NBER 1974) 1. 
11 ‘This view of tort has fallen into disregard among most lawyers. They will argue that the cumbersome nature of 
the law and the impact of injurer ignorance about the law, insurance and the high costs and delays of litigation make 
it implausible that tort deters wrongful behaviour … Thus it is implausible that this objective is overriding.’ C. 
Veljanovski, Economic Principles of Law (Cambridge University Press 2007) 183.   
12 It is indeed well known that rules on State liability are also predicated on the ambition to provide incentives to 
States and their agencies, see G. Dari-Mattiaci, N. Garoupa and F. Gomez-Pomar, ‘State Liability’ (2010) European 
Review of Private Law, 773-811. On State liability in EU law, see e.g. P. Aalto, Public Liability in EU Law: Brasserie, 
Bergaderm and Beyond (Hart Publishing 2011) chapter 6. 
13 Veljanovksi (n 11) 241, 245. 
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discharge an ‘economic activity’ on the other hand. This interpretation is in line with the 
prevailing understanding in conventional EU law.14 
The article is structured as follows. The two first sections analyse how the Commission and 
the CJEU apply the relevant rules to deter the State and the firm in EU environmental (2) and 
competition (3) laws. We show that in these instances, the function, operation, and procedure of 
deterrence is softer on the State than it is on the firm. We call this the two-tier deterrence 
hypothesis (4). We find that the State/firm dichotomy is in line with existing deterrence literature, 
which primarily focuses on the firm, and gives little attention to State deterrence. We argue, 
however, that to a certain degree, the State is a social organisation that falls within the framework 
of deterrence scholarship, thereby calling into question the current State/firm dichotomy (5). The 
article concludes with a discussion of possible items for future research (6).   
 
2. Deterring the State: Environmental Law a Case Study 
Environmental protection is a key public policy of the EU. This is evidenced by a number of 
treaty provisions,15 including Article 3(3) Treaty of the European Union (TEU), which provides 
that the Union shall ‘work for the sustainable development of Europe based on…a high level of 
protection and improvement of the quality of the environment.’ A similar wording is found in 
Article 37 of the now legally binding Charter on fundamental rights of the EU, which offers 
environmental protection in the EU legal context human rights significance.16  
                                                     
14 See e.g. P. Craig and G. de Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (6 edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 206, 
1003.   
15 E.g. Article 21 TEU makes reference to the EU’s external environmental competences, Article 11 TFEU sets out 
the integration principle, Title XXI extends the EU’s influence to the energy sector and Article 114(3) obliges the 
Commission to consider environmental protection in its legislative proposals. For an overview, see H. Vedder, 
'Treaty of Lisbon and European Environmental Law and Policy' (2010) 22 Journal of Environmental Law 285. 
16 S. Bogojević, 'EU Human Rights Law and Environmental Protection: The Beginning of a Beautiful Friendship?' in 
S. Douglas-Scott and N. Hatzis (eds), EU Human Rights Law (Edward Elgar 2016 forthcoming). 
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It may seem obvious that EU environmental law is concerned with environmental 
problems.17 However, historically at least, the EU rules on environment were equally, if not more, 
concerned with the elimination of obstacles to the rolling out of the internal market. Many 
secondary legislation instruments related to the environment were enacted on the basis of 
internal market provisions with the aim of ironing out disparities in national legislation, which 
caused differences in conditions of competition and, as a result, undermined market integration.18 
The discipline, however, has undergone a vibrant evolution and morphed into a public policy of 
its own – although its legal context, or more precisely, the internal market, inevitably affects the 
type of laws that are enacted. As such, the EU has proved a key player in using some of its 
environmental competences to legislate across a wide range of environmental issues, including 
managing air pollution, biodiversity and waste, as well as establishing procedural safeguards, such 
as environmental impact assessment, access to justice and environmental information, and public 
participation in environmental decision-making.19  
In terms of the number of legal instruments in place, EU environmental law is a densely 
populated subject.20 Those instruments generally come in the form of directives that require 
domestic implementation.21 However, the transposition is often far from effective. As explained 
by Wennerås, the most persistent problem in EU environmental law ‘is not the absence of 
adequate laws, but the flawed and belated Member State transposition, as well as insufficient 
application and enforcement of those rules’.22  
                                                     
17 Although defining the relevant ‘laws’, ‘environmental problems’ and aims and objectives of solutions is deeply 
complicated, see E. Fisher, B. Lange and E. Scotford, Environmental Law: Text, cases, and materials (Oxford University 
Press 2013) chapters 1-3.  
18 Bogojević, Emissions Trading Schemes  (n 7) 72.  
19 See M. Lee, EU Environmental Law, Governance and Decision-Making (2 edn, Hart Publishing 2014).  
20  For an overview, see J. Jans and H. Vedder, European Environmental Law - After Lisbon (4 edn, Europa Law 
Publishing 2011).  
21 M. Peeters and R. Uylenburg (eds), EU Environmental Legislation: Legal Perspectives on Regulatory Strategies (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2014) Part 2. 
22 P. Wennerås, The Enforcement of EC Environmental Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 1-2.  
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Almost equally, Member States convictions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for 
failure to comply with EU environmental law, including environmental directives, call for 
transposition. In order to induce the Member States to observe their duty to transpose in this 
regard, financial sanctions were introduced in the Maastricht Treaty, now codified in Article 260 
TFEU, vesting the Commission with enforcement power.  
 
A. Deterrence and Article 260 TFEU  
At its core, the underlying objective of Article 260 TFEU is to deter Member States from 
breaching their ‘duty to transpose’. We use here the concept of ‘duty to transpose’ in the sense of 
the failure of a State (i) to transpose an environmental directive following a Court judgment 
under Article 258 TFEU or (ii) to communicate the measures adopted to transpose a directive to 
the Commission. In this context, financial sanctions are deemed ‘the most appropriate 
instrument’. 23  Pursuant to Article 260 TFEU two types of fines can be imposed: penalty 
payments and lump sum fines.  
More precisely, Article 260(1) TFEU prescribes that a Member State found in breach of 
EU law by the ECJ must take necessary measures to implement the judgment. Shirking on this 
may lead to penalties issued by day of delay after the delivery of the judgment, and/or a lump 
sum sanctioning the continuation of the infringement after the initial judgment making a finding 
of infringement.24 It is on this premise, and based on Article 260(2) TFEU, that the Commission 
may refer the matter for a second time to the ECJ and in doing so, specify the amount of the 
penalty payment and/or lump sum to be paid by the Member States in question. The Court 
                                                     
23 Commission Communication on the Application of Article 228 EC, SEC(2005) 1658, para. 10.  
24 Ibid para. 10.3. The Court may also issue that the penalty payments are to be paid in monthly, quarterly or annual 
instalments see Section 2(B).  
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enjoys full discretion on the penalty payment and/or lump sum to be imposed on the infringing 
Member State. As such, the Court is not bound by the Commission’s penalty recommendations.25   
The Lisbon Treaty added a third limb to this article, Article 260(3) TFEU. This provision 
deals with a distinct breach of the duty to transpose. In EU law, Member States are under a 
general obligation to report to the Commission on the steps taken to implement EU legislation.  
Article 260(3) TFEU seeks to give some teeth to this obligation, by introducing sanctions for 
failure to notify measures transposing a directive adopted under a legislative procedure. The 
rationale behind this provision is to soothe the endemic problem of omitted, delayed or 
inappropriate implementation of EU legislation by the Member States.26 In such instances, the 
Commission may bring a case to the ECJ, specifying the amount of the lump sum or penalty 
payment to be paid by the Member State concerned that it considers appropriate in the 
circumstances. If the Court finds that there is an infringement, it may impose financial sanctions 
but these, in contrast to the wording of Article 260(2) TFEU, may not exceed the amount 
specified by the Commission.  
This brief outline of Article 260 TFEU highlights at least two important points regarding 
deterrence against the State under EU law. First, it is conditioned on prior judicial approval. In 
the case of Article 260(2) TFEU, two rounds of legal proceedings are necessary: first, an initial 
Court finding of infringement of a Treaty obligation, which the ECJ has ruled refers to finding of 
an infringement under Article 258 TFEU;27and second, a Court finding of infringement of the 
duty to transpose its initial judgment. Article 260(3) TFEU also requires prior judicial approval 
but cases are dealt with at once by the Court. Article 260 TFEU proceedings are, in practice, 
                                                     
25 More precisely, the Court makes clear that, in this regard ‘the Commission’s suggestions cannot bind the Court 
and are merely guidance…[and] may contribute to ensuring that the Commission’s actions are transparent, 
foreseeable and consistent with legal certainty.’ Case C-533/11 Commission v Belgium [2013] nyr para. 52.  
26 Commission Communication, Implementation of Article 260(3) TFEU, SEC(2010) 1371 final, 4. 
27 According to the CJEU, the failure by a Member State to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty can be dealt with 
under Article 260(2) TFEU only in relation to infringements that the Court, ruling on the basis of Article 258 TFEU, 
has already established’, see Case C-196/13 Commission v Italy [2014] nyr, para. 32.  
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cumbersome. This may explain that penalties are only rarely imposed on States, and in many 
instances only as a final resort.  
Second, Article 260 TFEU cases are primarily about the failure to ‘transpose’ EU text or 
case law. With this seemingly obvious remark, we want to stress that Article 260 TFEU purports 
to end breaches of EU law in specific cases, no more. The Court says just this when it states that 
Article 260(2) TFEU is a ‘special judicial procedure, peculiar to Community law’ that is ‘not 
intended to compensate for damage caused by the Member State concerned, but to place it under 
economic pressure which induces it to put an end to the breach established.’28  
This is not to say that Article 260 TFEU does not pursue a deterrence goal. The 
Commission has indeed stressed the need to ensure the ‘appropriate amount’ of financial sanctions 
‘in order to ensure their deterrent effect.’29 It was backed by the Court, which held that it shall set 
financial penalties according to ‘the degree of persuasion and deterrence’ that appears to be 
required, and so as to prevent ‘similar infringements of EU law’,30 or even ‘the recurrence of similar 
infringements of EU law’.31 However, such statements remain overall rare in the case law,32 and 
they seem to concern only the imposition of lump sums. The following sections will also 
elucidate our overall argument that although deterrence is an inherent part of Article 260 TFEU, 
its application on the State is soft and one that encourages cooperation instead of compulsion.    
 
B. Sanctions for Non-Implementation of an ECJ Judgment  
The possibility of imposing fines for the failure to implement an ECJ judgment pursuant to 
Article 260(2) TFEU was, as mentioned earlier, introduced in the Maastricht Treaty but it took 
                                                     
28 Case C-304/02 Commission v France [2005] ECR I-06263, para. 91. Similar wording ibid.   
29 SEC(2005) 1658, para. 8.  
30 Case C-279/11 Commission v Ireland [2012] nyr, para. 66.  
31 Commission v Italy (n 27), para. 86. Emphasis added.  
32 Similar formulations are found in Case C-374/11 Commission v Ireland [2012] nyr, para. 48, and Case C-653/13 
Commission v Italy [2015] nyr, para. 65.   
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eight years for this provision to be put into practice.33 Since then, Article 260(2) TFEU has been 
only occasionally used.34 Almost half of the existing case law deals with judgments concerning the 
failure to transpose environmental directives, 35  and more precisely, directives on waste, 36 
integrated pollution prevention control,37 urban waste-water treatment,38 environmental impact 
assessment,39 inshore bathing water,40 common fisheries policy,41 and the deliberate release of 
genetically modified organisms. 42  Failure to transpose environmental directives may occur in 
three ways: non-transposition of the directive into national law; actual, but incorrect, 
transposition of the directive; actual and correct transposition of the directive, but non-
implementation.43 As previously explained, the sanctions that may be imposed in such cases are 
periodic penalty payments and fines in lump sum. The Court tends to consider them in this 
order, although this is not always the case. 44  Overall, a wide discrepancy exists in the 
jurisprudence on how sanctions are calculated and which considerations are relevant for the 
Court to consider in this regard. We show this next, discussing penalty payments and fines in 
lump sum in turn.  
 
(i) Penalty Payments  
                                                     
33 For a historical overview of Article 260(2) TFEU see I. Kilbey, 'Financial Penalties under Article 228(2) EC: 
Excessive Complexity?' (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 743.  
34 At the time of writing, (9th of November 2015), the ECJ has relied on what is today Article 260 TFEU in a total of 
twenty-nine cases. Similar observation of the scarce application of Article 260 TFEU is noted in P. Wennerås, 
'Sanctions against Member States under Article 260 TFEU: Alive, but not kicking?' (2012) 49 Common Market Law 
Review 145.  
35  In 2014, out of a total of five Court judgments under Article 260(2) TFEU, three were concerned with 
environmental law. These include Commission v Italy (n 27), Case C-378/13 Commission v Greece [2014] nyr, and Case C-
243/13 Commission v Sweden [2014] nyr. Of the total of twenty-nine cases noted ibid, twelve are concerned with 
environmental law; that is, almost half the relevant jurisprudence.   
36 Commission v Italy (n 27), Commission v Greece (n 35), Commission v Ireland (n 30), Case C-387/97 Commission v Greece 
[2000] ECR I-05047, Commission v Italy (n 32), Case C-167/14 Commission v Greece (no 3) nyr.       
37 Commission v Sweden (n 35). 
38 Commission v Belgium (n 25), Case C-576/11 Commission v Luxembourg [2013] nyr.   
39 Commission v Ireland (n 30).  
40 Case C-278/01 Commission v Spain [2003] ECR I-14141. 
41 Commission v France (n 28). 
42 Case C-121/07 Commission v France [2008] ECR I-09159.  
43 As described in Fisher and others, Environmental Law (n 17) 143-144.  
44 In Commission v Belgium (n 25), for instance, the Court first examines lump sum and then penalty payments.   
 11
Penalty payments seek to prompt Member States to end the infringement of their obligations. 
Accordingly, in Commission v France, where the Member State had complied with the original 
judgment in its entirety by the time the Article 260 TFEU-based case reached the CJEU docket, 
the imposition of a penalty payment was no longer deemed necessary.45 Moreover, the Court has 
repeatedly affirmed that the amount of penalty payment to be paid was predicated on the 
ambition to ‘induce’,46 ‘encourage’47 and ‘persuade’48 the defaulting Member State to bring to an 
end the infringement in question. In brief, penalty payments are only ordered when an 
infringement persists.   
The calculation of the appropriate amount of the penalty is based on three main 
parameters. The Court considers the duration of the infringement, its degree of seriousness and 
the ability of the Member State concerned to pay.49 These criteria are similar to those found in 
Guidelines issued by the Commission, whereby an initial flat-rate amount of EUR 640 per day is 
multiplied by: (i) a coefficient for seriousness on a scale of 1 to 20; (ii) a coefficient for duration 
on a scale of 1 to 3; and (iii) a fixed amount, ‘the n factor’, reflecting both the Member State’s 
capacity to pay and the number of votes it has in the Council of the EU.50  
In the Commission’s guidelines, the deterrence function of penalty payments is clearly 
expressed. The Commission explains that the imposition of periodic payments serves not only to 
ensure that the Member State brings the infringement to an end but also that it does not repeat 
the same offence.51 To reach that deterrent effect, the Commission makes clear that the amount 
                                                     
45 Ibid para. 28. The Court, however, ordered a lump sum to be paid. See also Commission v Luxembourg (n 38) para. 
43, and Commission v Sweden (n 35) para. 47.    
46 Commission v Italy (n 27) para 94.  
47 Commission v Spain (n 40) para. 42. 
48 Commission v Italy (n 27) para. 96.  
49 E.g. Commission v Luxembourg (n 38) para. 47, Commission v Belgium (n 25) para. 69, Commission v Italy (n 27) para 97. 
In Commission v Spain (n 40) para. 52, Commission v Sweden (n 35) para. 51.  
50 See Commission Communication on the Application of Article 260 TFEU. Up-dating of data used to calculate 
lump sum and penalty payments to be proposed by the Commission to the Court of Justice in infringement 
proceedings, SEC (2010) 923/3.  
51 Ibid para. 18. This is calculated by taking the gross domestic product (GDP) of the Member State into account and 
weighing the voting rights in the Council of the Member State. 
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of the periodic payments must outweigh the benefits that the Member State derives from the 
infringement.52  
In practice, the Court has tended to follow these guidelines (though with repeated 
reminders that it is not bound by them).53 Its methodology in doing so, however, is inconsistent. 
For instance, in some cases, it lists the mentioned criteria but then turns a blind eye on them.54 In 
contrast, in other cases, it applies them but it enriches them from other considerations, such as 
whether the penalty payment is both appropriate to the circumstances and proportionate to the 
infringement established and the ability of the Member State concerned to pay,55 as well as having 
regard to the effects on public and private interests of failure to comply and to the urgency with 
which the Member States concerned must be induced to fulfil its obligations.56 Its wide discretion 
in doing so makes the method of determining penalty payments difficult to predict. Yet a salient 
trend in the evolution of the Court’s case law is its proclivity to make space to bona fide 
cooperation defences invoked by infringing States, this despite the fact that the wording of 
Article 260(2) TFEU does not provide for any line of excuse.57  
Let us sift in more detail through the three criterions. On the first criterion – the 
‘seriousness’ of any environmental law infringement – the Court tends to link the relevant 
environmental law breach to Article 191 TFEU, which sets out the key objectives of EU 
environmental policy. From this perspective, it then can derive the importance of environmental 
protection as a public policy, which tends to lead it to the conclusion that harm to the 
environment is ‘particularly serious.’58 On this point, the Court does not seem to accept any 
excuses.  
                                                     
52 Ibid.  
53 Commission v Greece (n 36) para. 89, Commission v Italy (n 32) para. 72.       
54 See for instance Commission v Sweden (n 35) paras. 51-60.  
55 Commission v Greece (n 35) para. 52. See also Commission v Sweden (n 35) para. 50, Commission v Italy (n 27) para. 96. 
56 Commission v Luxembourg (n 38) para. 47.  
57 Still it recognises the ‘right of defence that the Member State concerned must be able to exercise’. The Court labels 
these ‘procedural guarantees’, see Commission v France (n 28) paras 92-93.  
58 Commission v Italy (n 27) para. 98. See also Commission v Greece (n 35) para. 54.    
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On the second criterion, that is duration of the infringement, the Court tends to take the 
view that the longer that the infringement has been allowed to persist, the more serious the 
breach.59 Any signs of collaboration in transposing EU law may, however, account as a mitigating 
factor. The court explains that ‘a penalty which does not take account of the progress which a 
Member State may have made in complying with its obligations is neither appropriate to the 
circumstances nor proportionate to the breach which has been found.’60 By the same token, 
inaction on the part of Member States in taking steps to put an end to its infringement of EU law 
tends to be seen as an aggravating factor in the Court’s calculation of fines.61   
Finally, in terms of the capacity of the Member State concerned to pay, the Court deems it 
necessary to take account of recent trends in a Member State’s gross domestic product at the 
time of the Court’s examination of the facts.62 Its case law displays leniency towards Member 
States that face difficulties in times of macro-economic hardship.63 In Commission v Greece, for 
instance, the Court stated that ‘it is appropriate to take account of the Hellenic Republic’s 
argument that its GDP has declined since 2010’, or more broadly, recent trends in the GDP of a 
Member State at the time of the Court’s examination of the facts.64 Based on these factors, it 
decreased the penalty payment suggested by the Commission to be imposed on the Member 
States.  
Besides this crude three-pronged method for the setting of periodic penalties, Member 
States have also sought to challenge periodic payments on grounds of more general arguments. 
Often, the Court has seemed reluctant to give currency to such defences. For instance, the Court 
has made clear that, in line with classic EU case law, complexity of implementation or internal 
                                                     
59 Most of these cases deal with long-term infringements. Ireland, for instance, was found after 19 years still not to 
have complied with its obligations, see Commission v Ireland (n 32) para. 38. In Commission v Italy (n 27) the 
infringement has persisted for more than seven years.   
60 Commission v Spain (n 40) para. 49. See also Commission v Ireland (n 32) para. 39-42. In Commission v Luxembourg (n 38) 
para. 55, the Court makes the note that the penalty payment needs to be proportionate to the share of its obligations 
carried out. Similar point in Commission v Belgium (n 25) para. 70. 
61 See Commission v Italy (n 32) para. 78. 
62 Commission v Italy (n 27) para. 104.  
63 Commission v Ireland (n 32) para. 44, See also Commission v Greece (No 3) (n 36).   
64 Commission v Greece (n 35) para. 58.  
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difficulties in ensuring implementation cannot be taken into consideration. On this point, the 
Court explains that ‘Member States cannot plead provisions, practices or situations prevailing in 
its domestic legal order to justify the failure to observe obligations arising under European Union 
Law’65 – a view it has confirmed in recent case law.66  
In Commission v Sweden, the Court even went as far as to consider that a Member State could 
not invoke constitutional issues for failing to implement an environmental directive on time. In 
the case in point, Sweden deemed it impossible to fasten the process of issuing authorisation to 
installations for their industrial activities, as required by the Integration Pollution Prevent Control 
(IPPC) directive, due to its constitution that requires judicial preapproval for such an 
authorisation process.67 Although the court dismissed this general defence, and found that a 
penalty payment could not be excluded on such ground, it took cooperation with the 
Commission in the pre-litigation phase into consideration in the calculation of the fine. The fact 
that Sweden had failed to issue authorisation permits in respect of only two out of twenty-nine 
installations, which, the parties agreed, meant that Sweden’s non-compliance had limited effect 
on the environment and human health, also had a bearing on the Court’s calculation of penalty 
payment.68 In light of this, the court almost halved the suggested fine.69  
In terms of the final penalties ordered by the ECJ, there is variance both in the level of 
fines imposed and the instalments of their payment. Penalties ordered range from €2,800 to 
€120,00070 to be paid on a daily or even annual basis until the date on which the Member State 
complies with the original judgment.71 The court may also order specific sums to be deduced 
                                                     
65 Commission v Ireland (n 32) para. 39.  
66 Commission v Italy (n 32) para. 39, Commission v Greece (n 35) para. 29.       
67 Commission v Sweden (n 35) para. 53.  
68 Ibid paras. 54-58.  
69 The initial penalty payment was issued at €14912 and reduced to €7456 per day until the initial judgment is 
implemented.  
70 Commission v Luxembourg (n 38), Commission v Italy (n 32) respectively.  
71 For instance, in Commission v Belgium (n 25) the Member State was ordered to pay a fine of €4,722 for each day of 
delay in adopting measures necessary to ensure compliance with the original judgment; in Commission v France (n 28) 
the Member State was ordered to pay €57,761,250 for each period of six months from delivery of the present 
judgment until the original judgment has not been complied with; while in Commission v Spain (n 40) the Member 
State was order to pay €624,150 per year. 
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from the overall fine in line with the Member State’s progress in implementing environmental 
law.72 This type of flexibility offered to the Member States may be regarded as soft deterrence. All 
payments are directed to the European Union own resources.  
 
b) Lump Sums Fines 
Whereas penalty payments seek to induce Member States to end to an on-going infringement, 
lump sum fines are ordered with a view to prevent the ‘future repetition of similar infringements 
of European Union law’. 73  Lump sums may thus be ordered regardless of whether the 
infringement has ceased by the time of the judgment.74 The Court sees lumps sum as particularly 
apposite where a Member State repeatedly engages in unlawful conduct. This is thought to call for 
a ‘dissuasive measure’, such as the imposition of a lump sum payment, so as to effectively prevent 
‘future repetition of similar infringements of EU law’.75  
The Court resorts to factors similar to those taken in consideration for penalty payments in 
determining the size of the lump sum; that is, seriousness of the infringement, duration of the 
breach in question, and conduct of the Member State in breach.76 In applying these criteria, it 
considers the effects of the infringement on public and private interests.77 The Court, however, is 
as inconsistent in its methodology in determining lump sums fines as it is in setting penalty 
payments. Although it tends to adhere to the three criterions, at times, it refers to these as mere 
                                                     
72 For instance in Commission v Greece (n 35) the Member State was order to pay a total sum of €14,520,000, from 
which €40,000 to be deduced in respect of each uncontrolled waste disposal site, and €80,000 to be deducted in 
respect of each such site that has been both closed down and cleaned. 
73 Commission v Ireland (n 30) para. 70. Similar wording in Commission v Italy (n 27), para. 116, Commission v Belgium (n 25) 
para. 61. 
74 Commission v France (n 42).  
75 Commission v France (n 42) para. 60, and similarly in Commission v Italy (n 27) paras. 89-91 and Commission v Sweden (n 
35) para. 63. In the latter case, the mention of deterring the ‘breach of EU law’ is specifically spelled out.  
76 Commission v Belgium (n 25) para. 53, Commission v Italy (n 27) para. 118.   
77 Commission v Luxembourg (n 38) para. 57. Similar wording in Commission v France (n 42) para. 64, Commission v Greece (n 
35) para. 72.  
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‘considerations’,78 suggesting that their application is not compulsory, or it lists the criteria but 
fails to explain how they apply in reaching the final lump sum fine.79 In other instances, the Court 
explains that it considers not only the three criterions but ‘all the relevant factors pertaining to 
both the particular nature of the infringement established and the individual conduct of the 
Member State involved in the procedure instigated pursuant to Article 260 TFEU’80 in the fixing 
of the amount of the lump sum. Determining lumps sum fines is thus an act of wide judicial 
discrepancy.  
Returning to the three criterions, it is worth mentioning that in examining the seriousness 
of the infringement is concerned, the Court makes clear that where failure to transpose one of its 
judgments is likely to harm the environment, there is a breach of ‘particularly serious’ nature. The 
ECJ considers that environmental protection is one of the European Union’s key policy 
objectives, as is apparent from Article 191 TFEU.’81 With regard to duration, the fact that an 
infringement has been allowed to persist seems sufficient to order a lump sum. This was the case 
in Commission v Luxembourg.82 As far as the conduct of the infringing Member State is concerned, 
considerations taken into account by the Court include whether the State has cooperated with the 
Commission in the pre-litigation stage. Here, considerable efforts, or any concrete steps that the 
Member States may have taken to ensure compliance (showing the will to ‘cooperate in good 
faith’83) with the original judgment are favourably included in the Court’s calculation.84 Thus 
cooperation is a mitigating factor – similarly to repeated violations 85  or inaction being an 
aggravating factor86 – also in calculating lump sum fines.  
With regard to the availability of defences, the Court is clear on the point that any political, 
                                                     
78 Commission v Greece (n 35) para. 76. Also, here, the Court fails to mention the third criterion found elsewhere in its 
jurisprudence on the application of lump sums, that is, ‘the Member State’s ability to pay.’ 
79 Commission v Sweden (n 35), paras. 61-67. 
80 Commission v Luxembourg (n 38) para. 58. Emphasis added.  
81 Commission v Belgium (n 25) para. 56. Similar wording in Commission v France (n 42) paras. 77-78, Commission v Ireland 
(n 30) para. 72.    
82 Commission v Luxembourg (n 38) para. 65.  
83 Commission v France (n 42) para. 86. 
84 Commission v Luxembourg (n 38) paras. 62-63, See e.g. Commission v France (n 42) para. 85-86. 
85 Commission v Italy (n 27) para 115-116, Commission v Italy (n 32) paras. 74-80, 90.       
86 Commission v Italy (n 32) paras. 74-80, 91.  
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or internal circumstances delaying the adoption of the measures in question is not accepted. 
More precisely, it states that ‘a Member State cannot plead provisions, practices or situations 
prevailing in its domestic legal order to justify failure to observe obligations arising under 
European Union law.’87 This meant that France could not rely on social unrest in failing to 
implement directives on GMOs.88 With regard to economic difficulties that Member States may 
face in implementing EU environmental law, the Court tends to show more sympathy. In 
Commission v Ireland, Ireland contests inter alia the methodology used by the Commission to 
calculate the value of ‘n’, corresponding to Ireland’s ability to pay.89 The Court, without much 
elaboration, accepted this as a diminishing factor in establishing the lump sum.90 
The lump sum that have to date been ordered span over €1,5 million,91 €2 million,92 €10 
million,93 €20 million94 to €40 million95 imposed on the state in question to pay.   
 
C. Fines for Non-Communication  
Article 260(3) TFEU fines sanction Member States that do not communicate to the Commission 
the measures adopted to transpose EU directives. As such, Article 260(3) TFEU is not about the 
duty to transpose, but about the duty to communicate. However, as the Commission noted, the 
duty to communicate is a variant of the duty to transpose effectively EU legislation: 
The purpose of [Article 260(3) TFEU] is to give a stronger incentive to 
Member States to transpose directives within the deadlines laid down by 
the legislator and hence to ensure that Union legislation is genuinely 
effective…this is not only a matter of safeguarding the general interests 
pursued by Union legislation…but also and above all of protecting 
                                                     
87 Commission v Ireland (n 30) para. 71.  
88 Commission v France (n 42) para. 72.  
89 Commission v Ireland (n 30) para. 42.  
90 Commission v Ireland (n 30) paras. 78-79. The economic crisis was taken into account as a mitigating factor also in 
Commission v Ireland (n 32) para. 52 and Commission v Greece (no 3) (n 36).    
91 Commission v Ireland (n 30).  
92 Commission v Ireland (n 32) para. 52, Commission v Luxembourg (n 38) para. 67, Commission v Sweden (n 35) para. 66.  
93 Commission v Belgium (n 25), Commission v Greece (n 35), Commission v France (n 42), Commission v Greece (No 3)(n 36).  
94 Commission v France (n 28), Commission v Italy (n 32).       
95 Commission v Italy (n 27).  
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European citizens who enjoy individual rights under such legislation. 
Ultimately, it is the credibility of Union law as a whole. 
According to the Commission financial sanctions are only effective if fixed at a level that is 
able to ensure the deterrent effect of the sanction. As such, ‘purely symbolic penalties’ are seen to 
‘render this instrument useless and run counter to the objective of ensuring that directives are 
transposed within the time limits laid down.’96 To reach an effective level, the Commission seems 
to rely on criteria similar to those applied under Article 260(2) TFEU.  
At the same time, a spirit of cooperation equally seems to permeate Article 260(3) TFEU 
fines. The Commission stresses, for instance, that ‘in line with the principle of sincere 
cooperation’, a Member State that indicates that it has partially failed to notify measures will be 
allowed ‘mitigating circumstance leading to a lower coefficient for seriousness’ compared to case 
of complete failure to notify measures.97 The need to cooperate to make EU laws effective thus 
clearly underpins also Article 260(3) TFEU.  
Moreover, and in spite of the relatively limited track record of the Commission under 
Article 260(3) TFEU – no judgment has yet been delivered on this provision – the Commission 
has confirmed in practice that cooperation was the purpose of Article 260(3) TFEU. All cases 
brought under Article 260(3) TFEU since 2011 have in the meantime been withdrawn from the 
Court due to complete transposition.98 In this way, Article 260(3) TFEU comes close to periodic 
payments adopted pursuant to Article 260(2) TFEU, that seek primarily to end on-going 
infringements. 
 
D. Summation  
                                                     
96 Ibid para. 15. 
97 Ibid para. 25.  
98 Ibid para. 20. 
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The case law above evidences that Article 260 TFEU is used as a tool designed to initiate 
cooperation in transposing EU law. As such, any deterrence used on the State is soft. This is 
obvious on several points, including the calculation of fines. Here, the Court tends to follow the 
Commission’s criteria, albeit with wide discrepancy, taking into consideration three key factors 
(seriousness of the infringement, duration and the ability of the Member State to pay – including 
its votes in the Council), as well other considerations, such as, the effects on public and private 
interests, and conduct by the Member State. Although the Court’s methodology in calculating 
fines is somewhat erratic, it is geared favourably toward cooperation. This means that 
infringements that persist over long periods of time tend to signal the need for heavy sanctions, 
whilst signs of cooperation in trying to end the breach mitigate such calculations, as does any 
economic difficulty that the defaulting Member States may evidence.  
The fact that cooperation underlies Article 260 TFEU is also clear from the infringements 
it covers: non-transposition of ECJ judgments under Article 258 TFEU, and non-communication 
to the Commission of transposition measures. Any deterrence applied in this context is with the 
aim to coerce the State back to cooperating in transposing directives and case law. This has 
implications for the type of penalties available to the Court. For instance, Member States can 
avoid penalty payments if they comply with the initial judgment by the date of the second round 
of litigation.99  
The Commission raised a valuable objection to this narrow scope of fines in Commission v 
Sweden. It demanding that any excess pollution emitted due to the Member State’s failure to 
comply with EU environmental law, as well as any competitive advantage enjoyed by the relevant 
industries need to be accounted for in fines imposed.100 What the Commission, in brief, seemed 
to ask for is a punitive and not mere cooperation-motivated fining system. Although the Court 
                                                     
99 A point made also by Wennerås (n 34) 162.  
100 Commission v Sweden (n 35) para. 39.  
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imposed financial sanctions on the Member States in this case, it did not acknowledge the 
Commission’s mentioned remark.   
To date, the Court imposed its highest fines in two separate cases against Italy: one in 
which a deductible penalty payment of €120,000 for each day of delay in adopting measures 
necessary to ensure compliance with the original judgment was imposed,101 and the other, in 
which a record of €40 million in lump sum was ordered.102 These are indisputably hefty sums but 
they were ordered to end infringements concerning hazardous waste, which present a high level 
of danger to human health and the environment and, which, in the latter case, had been a general 
and persistent breach located in almost every Italian region for a period of more than seven years. 
The longest, persisting breach, however, was found in Commission v Ireland, where the Member 
State had failed to comply with EU waste law for more than nineteen years. Ireland was ordered 
to pay a penalty payment of €12,000 for each day of delay in complying with the relevant 
judgment and a lump sum of €2 million.103 This suggests that sanctions imposed on the State are 
the final resort in ensuring that infringements are put to an end. Even if at first glance they may 
appear high, they are dwarfed by fines imposed on firms in competition law – as we show later.104   
Lastly, deterrence on States under Article 260 TFEU may be seen as soft also as it may 
only be imposed following long, evidentiary requirements of legal proceedings.105 As such, it 
severely limits the Commission in pursuing environmental law breaches. In part this is due to the 
procedural limitations of Article 260(2) TFEU, or as the Court explains in Commission v 
Luxembourg: the Commission may only rely on this provision if its complaints are ‘identical in fact 
and in law to those put forward in the [first] case’.106 This, together with the high costs and long 
                                                     
101 Commission v Italy (n 32).  
102 Commission v Italy (n 27).  
103 Comission v Ireland (n 32).  
104 Section 3.  
105 As discussed in the English environmental context, A. Ogus and C. Abbot, 'Sanctions for pollution: do we have 
the right regime?' (2002) 13 Journal of Environmental Law 283.  
106 Case C-526/08 Commission v Luxembourg [2010] ECR I-06151 para. 23.  
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rounds of litigation affects the probability of being detected and thus also the severity of 
deterrence on the State.  
 
3. Deterring the Firm: Competition Law as a Case-Study 
Another public policy of primary prominence in the EU is competition.107 Protocol No 27 of the 
Lisbon Treaty recalls that the internal market ‘includes a system ensuring that competition is not 
distorted’. This system is found in Articles 101 to 109 TFEU, which prohibit several types of 
distortions of competition by firms and States.108 Chief in those provisions are the antitrust 
prohibitions of anticompetitive coordination of Article 101 TFEU and abuse of dominance of 
Article 102 TFEU.  Conceptually, both provisions impose a ‘duty to compete’ on firms. 
The political economy reasons that underpin the existence of a EU competition policy are 
well known.109 Competition policy is originally a trade instrument. With the elimination of public 
obstacles to cross-border trade in the internal market, a risk was anticipated in the 1950s that 
domestic firms subject to foreign competition would attempt to reinstate obstacles to trade 
through, for instance, private arrangements, market partitioning, distribution contracts, 
discrimination on grounds of nationality, and boycotts.110 The original EU Treaty drafters thus 
sought to cement the process of market integration with a comprehensive set of rules that would 
tackle both public and private obstacles to trade.  
                                                     
107 See Eco-Swiss where the ECJ held that the competition rules constituted a ‘matter of public policy’ (Case C-
126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV, ECR [1999] I-03055, para. 39). 
108 The Treaty does not talk of firms, but of ‘undertakings’.  
109 The first Report on Competition Policy stated that ‘Competition is the best stimulant of economic activity since it 
guarantees the widest possible freedom of action to all ’. See Report on Competition Policy 1971, at p. 11. Available 
at:  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/ar_1971_en.pdf  
110 See Rapport des chefs de la délégation du Comité gouvernmental institué par la conférence de Messine, also 
known as SPAAK report, 21 April 1956: ‘La création d'un marché commun exige une action convergente suivant 
trois grandes orientations, autour desquelles sont articulées les propositions de ce rapport: établissement de 
conditions normales de concurrence et le développement harmonieux de l'ensemble des économies intéresses 
permettent d'envisager de parvenir, par étapes successives, a la suppression de toutes les protections qui font 
actuellement obstacle aux échanges et qui morcellent l'économie européenne’. See also, A. Albors-Llorens, 
'Competition Policy and the Shaping of the Single Market' in C. Barnard and J. Scott, ‘European 
Market: Unpacking the Premises (Hart Publishing, 2002) 311–31. 
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Besides this, the EU competition policy, however, has morphed year after year in a public 
policy of its own, disconnected from the internal trade agenda of the EU.  In this variant, EU 
competition law prohibits anticompetitive conduct for the sole reason that it inflicts consumer 
harm, regardless of whether it frustrates the achievement of the internal market.111 This in turn 
explains that EU competition cases may also concern business disputes between firms from a 
single Member State.112   
Article 103(2) a) TFEU indicates that ‘fines and periodic penalty payments’ are the 
applicable tools to ensure ‘compliance’ with the EU competition rules. Importantly, the EU 
Treaties seem to envision competition fines and periodic penalty payments as compliance 
instruments and is silent on a possible deterrence objective in this context. The implementation 
of these sanctions is left to be implemented through the adoption of secondary legislation. The 
key instrument in this regard is Regulation 1/2003.  
 
A. Deterrence and Regulation 1/2003 
In line with the above remarks, Regulation 1/2003 (‘Regulation’) enshrines the main principles 
governing sanctions in competition cases. From the outset, it ought to be mentioned that the 
Regulation gives the Commission a particularly prominent role in this process. 113  The 
Commission can impose lump sum fines on undertakings if they ‘intentionally or negligently’ 
infringe the rules on competition114 and inflict periodic penalty payments to compel firms to act 
in a certain way.115 Fines and periodic penalty payments set by the Commission are immediately 
                                                     
111 See D. Gerber, who as early as 1994, predicted this evolution, D. Gerber, ‘The Transformation of European 
Community Competition Law’ (Winter 1994) 35 Harvard International Law Journal, 97. 
112 Or that many interstate cases concern conducts that harms domestic firms, possibly at the advantage of non-
domestic firms.  Think, for instance, to the situation of collusive or dominant firms from country A that offer better 
terms to purchaser from country B than to rival from country A. 
113 This was already the case under the preceding regulation, see Regulation 17/62 (EEC Council), First Regulation 
implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, OJ (1962)13, p. 204–211. 
114 Article 23 of Regulation (n 5). 
115 Article 24 ibid 
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applicable. This means that the Commission benefits from the ‘privilège du préalable’, and that it 
can sanction infringements of competition law without seeking prior approval from the Court. 
To be sure, the ECJ is given an important a role under the Regulation – it has unlimited 
jurisdiction to cancel, decrease or increase fines imposed by the Commission – but as such, it is 
secondary. 116  Appeals before the EU courts are, however, not suspensive. This rather strict 
regime is often rationalized on the ground that fines are said in the Regulation to be not of ‘a 
criminal law nature’.117 Once they become final, fines are booked as revenue in the EU budget. 
They are subsequently discounted from the yearly Member States contributions, as we describe 
later.118 
Shortly after the adoption of the Regulation, the Commission brought two important 
innovations in its fining policy. It introduced a leniency programme exonerating partially or fully 
from fines those repentant firms that are ready to report unlawful activity.119 At the same time, 
the Commission sharpened its fining policy, with the adoption of harsher Guidelines on the 
setting of fines.120 As a result, in the past 10 years, the Commission has used the leeway left by 
the 10 per cent turnover fining cap of the Regulation to hammer firms liable of infringements to 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.121 This has culminated with a fine of €1,470,515 in the TV and 
                                                     
116 Article 31, ibid, provides that ‘The Court of Justice shall have unlimited jurisdiction to review decisions whereby 
the Commission has fixed a fine or periodic penalty payment. It may cancel, reduce or increase the fine or periodic 
penalty payment imposed’. 
117 Article 23(5), ibid.   
118 Section 4.   
119 Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases OJ C 298, 8.12.2006, p. 17–22, 
and amended in the Communication from the Commission - Amendments to the Commission Notice on Immunity 
from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases OJ C 256, 5.8.2015, p. 1–1 
120 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003 OJ C 
210, 1.9.2006, p. 2–5. (‘Guidelines on the method of setting fines’) 
121 In the period between 1990-1994, the Commission imposed €539,691,550 in fines relating to cartel infringements. 
The figure highly contrasts with the increase in the amount of fines imposed in between 2005-2009: €9,414,012,500  
and in between 2010-2014: €8,930,678,674. In the field of abuse of dominance fines have as well seen an increase in 
the past years. For instance, in 2004, although Compagnie Maritime Belge (Case COMP/32.448 and 32.450) received 
a €3,400,000 fine, Microsoft (COMP/37.792) faced a €497,000,000 fine. In 2008 the Commission imposed a € 
899,000,000 penalty payment on Microsoft for non-compliance with the 2004 decision, and in 2009 the 
manufacturer of chips Intel (Case COMP/37.990) received the highest fine ever in an antitrust case: €1,060,000,000. 
Lastly, but non-exhaustively, in 2013 (Case COMP/39.530), Microsoft received a €561,000,000 fine for non-
compliance. The Commission has nevertheless also imposed symbolic fines in a number of cases, like Case 
COMP/36.915 - Deutsche Post AG (€1,000); Case COMP/36.888 - Football World Cup (€1,000); or even avoided to 
impose them, as in the emblematic case of the ice cabinets, Case COMP/34.073, 34.395 and 35.436 - Van den Bergh 
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computer monitor tubes cartels in 2012. Earlier, in 2009, the firm Intel had to pay a fine of more 
than €1 billion for unlawful abuse of dominance. These clearly dwarf fines imposed on States as 
discussed in the previous section.  
An issue of major interest concerns the function served by the EU fining system. Both the 
Treaty, at Article 103 TFEU, as well as Recital 29 of the Regulation, seem to envision fines and 
periodic penalty payments as intended ‘to ensure compliance’. The Court’s case law, however, has 
gone beyond the formulaic compliance goal set in the Treaty and secondary legislation, and 
introduced the additional goal of deterrence. In Chemiefarma v Commission, the Court explained that 
the purpose of sanctions ‘is to suppress illegal activities and to prevent any reference’.122 Even 
more explicitly, the CJEU noted in Musique Diffusion Française that the Commission must ensure 
that ‘its action has the necessary deterrent effect’.123  Similarly, in Archer Daniels Midlands, the 
General Court (GC) stressed: ‘[d]eterrence is one of the main considerations which must guide 
the Commission when setting fines imposed for an infringement of the Community competition 
rules. If the fine were set at a level which merely negated the profits of the cartel, it would not be 
a deterrent’.124 Finally, in Microsoft v Commission, the GC talked of the ‘shared characteristics and 
objectives’ of fines and periodic penalty payments, and noted that ‘a fine and a periodic penalty 
payment both relate to the conduct of an undertaking as revealed in the past and both of them 
require a deterrent effect in order to prevent repetition or continuation of the infringement’.125  
Those judicial pronouncements leave little doubt over the deterrence function of 
competition fines. This idea has been later embarked by the Commission in various soft law 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Foods Ltd. See more in “Cartel Statistics”, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf 
122 Case C-41/69, ACF Chemiefarma v Commission, [1970] ECR 661, para. 173.  
123 See  Joined Cases C-100–103/80 Musique Diffusion Française v EC Commission (Pioneer) [1983] ECR 1825 para. 106; 
Joined Cases C-189/02 P, 202/02 P, 205/02 P – 208 /02 P and C-213/02 P, Dansk Rorindustri A/S v Commission, 
[2005] ECR I-5425. 
124 Case T-59/02, Archer Daniels Midland v Commission, [2006] ECR II-3085. 
125 Case T-167/08 Microsoft Corp. v Commission [2012] ECR II-000 28 para. 94. 
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instruments, including the above-mentioned Guidelines, which conspicuously hail deterrence as 
the primary purpose of the EU fining policy:126  
The Commission must ensure that its action has the necessary 
deterrent effect. Accordingly, when the Commission discovers that 
Article 81 or 82 of the Treaty [today, Articles 102 and 103 TFEU] has 
been infringed, it may be necessary to impose a fine on those who have 
acted in breach of the law. Fines should have a sufficiently deterrent 
effect, not only in order to sanction the undertakings concerned 
(specific deterrence) but also in order to deter other undertakings from 
engaging in, or continuing, behaviour that is contrary to Articles 81 and 
82 of the EC Treaty (general deterrence). 
This notwithstanding, the explicit admission of firm deterrence as the function of 
competition fines does not imply the exclusion of other goals. Wils for instance observes that 
competition fines may also have ancillary purposes, like reinforcing the moral commitment to 
compliance of law-abiding firms.127 Additional finalities can be ascribed to competition fines. For 
instance, due to their confiscatory nature, fines are often said to provide revenge to society.128 
They also are deemed to inflict reputational damage with consumers and shareholders, though 
those secondary effects are not empirically documented.129  
In competition law, penalties can be inflicted in three types of circumstances: substantive 
infringement, procedural infringement, and non-compliance with a decision finding of 
infringement. We deal with these in turn.  
                                                     
126 Guidelines on the method of setting fines (n 120), para. 4. 
127 W. Wils, Efficiency and Justice in European Antitrust Enforcement (Hart Publishing, 2008) 55. 
128 This idea is originally traced to J. Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, (The University of Adelaide Library 2014), at 
Chapter XVI (Of Vindictive Satisfaction): ‘… every species of satisfaction naturally bringing in its train a punishment 
to the defendant, a pleasure of vengeance for the party injured. This pleasure is a gain: it recals the riddle of Samson; 
it is the sweet which comes out of the strong; it is the honey gathered from the carcase of the lion. Produced without 
expense, net result of an operation necessary on other accounts, it is an enjoyment to be cultivated as well as any 
other; for the pleasure of vengeance, considered abstractedly, is, like every other pleasure, only good in itself. It is 
innocent so long as it is confined within the limits of the laws; it becomes criminal at the moment it breaks them. It 
is not vengeance, which ought to be regarded as the most malignant and most dangerous passion of the human 
heart; it is antipathy, it is intolerance: these are the enmities of pride, of prejudice, of religion, and of politics. In a 
word, that enmity is not dangerous which has foundation, but that which is without a legitimate cause..’ For further 
references and discussion, see D. G. Owen, ‘Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation’ (Jun 1976) 74 
Michigan Law Review 1257-1371. 
129 See E. M. Iacobucci, ‘On the Interaction between Legal and Reputational Sanctions (2014) 43 Journal of Legal 
Studies, Article 8.  What is clear, however, is that competition fines are inapt as such to achieve certain specific 
purposes, like the compensation of antitrust harm. Even though they give rise to disgorgement, fines are channelled 
to the EU public budget not to the victims of anticompetitive conduct. Their corrective justice effect is at best 
limited. Compensation of antitrust harm is a matter left to subjective inter partes proceedings before ordinary courts 
who can apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
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B. Fines for Substantive Infringements  
Antitrust fines are primarily inflicted when firms enter into unlawful coordination or abuse of 
dominance, in breach of the substantive conduct prohibitions set in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
As per the case law, those fines are seen as instruments to deter anticompetitive business conduct 
that causes consumer harm.   
The spirit of deterrence of antitrust fines transpires from their calculation method, which is 
explained in the Guidelines.130 The basic idea consists in capturing the ‘basic amount’ of total 
profits (or harm) achieved through anticompetitive activity and then inflate it from an ‘additional 
amount’.131 With this, the Commission seeks to signal to profit maximizing infringers that an 
antitrust infringement is a loss-making strategy, because the fine confiscates more than the total 
anticompetitive profits.   
The concrete equation applied by the Commission is, however, a little more complex and 
can be illustrated with a fictional example. Imagine that firm A is a widget manufacturer who has 
participated in a price-fixing cartel between 2000 and 2010.  In 2010, Firm A sold 1.000.000,00 of 
widgets at a cartelized unit price of 100€. To calculate the ‘basic amount’ of the fine, the 
Commission will first compute the value of sales of the goods or services to which the 
infringement relates. For ease of calculation, the Commission relies on the value of sales achieved 
in the last full business year of its participation in the infringement. In our example, this 
represents €100 million. To this amount, the Commission then applies a gravity and duration 
coefficient.132 The gravity coefficient seeks to reflect the competitive harm caused by the type of 
                                                     
130 See, Guidelines on the method of setting fines (n 120). The Commission’s 2006 initiative to provide transparency 
on fines calculation is often said to respond to a rights of defence imperative, in what comes close to criminal 
penalties.  However, it seems that the Commission’s primary intention is to raise firms’ awareness of the cost and 
benefits of an infringement and, in turn, to achieve deterrence. Prior to 2006, the Commission had adopted other 
Guidelines. 
131 See paras. 19 and 25 of the Guidelines on the method of setting fines (n 120). 
132 In line with the wording of Article 23 (1) of the Regulation (n 5) 
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infringement under scrutiny. In other words, it is a proxy for the anticompetitive profits achieved 
thanks to the infringement. As a general rule, for cartels, a proportion of 30 per cent of the value 
of sales is taken into account.133 In our example, the Commission will retain an amount of €30 
million, which represents a crude estimate of the profits achieved by firm A thanks to the cartel.  
In turn, the Commission will multiply this amount by the number of years of participation to the 
infringement.  In our example, the Commission will reach a figure of €300 million. This can be 
deemed to represent the total cartel profits made by firm A, as well as the number of years during 
which it escaped the surveillance of antitrust agencies (or in economic terms, the probability of 
being caught). To that figure, the Commission will then apply an ‘additional amount’ of 15 to 25 
per cent of the value of sales.  This additional amount plays as a deterrence fee.  It seeks to tilt 
the cost-benefit calculus in the negative. In our example, this represents a range of €15 to 25 
million. The basic amount that Firm A will thus has to pay is comprised between €315 and 325 
million.  
The last step of the calculation consists in adjusting that amount in light of possible of 
aggravating – recidivism, obstruction to investigation and instigation of infringement – and 
mitigating circumstances – negligence, pro-active cooperation with investigation. Aggravating 
circumstances like recidivism are sanctioned by a 100 per cent increase of the fine amount. In our 
example, if Firm A had also participated in a cartel in a distinct market, the Commission can 
double the fine up to €730-750 million. Finally, if the firm that has infringed competition law has 
‘a particularly large turnover beyond the sales of goods or services to which the infringement 
relates’, the Commission can further increase the fine to achieve additional deterrence.134 
                                                     
133 Note that this proportion can be decreased if the infringement is less serious.   
134 Guidelines on the method of setting fines (n 120), paras. 30-31. 
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The magnitude of fines is not without limitations. Twice, the Regulation insists that the 
fine shall not exceed 10 per cent of its total turnover in the preceding business year.135 In Musique 
Diffusion Française, the Court explained that the purpose of this cap is ‘to prevent fines from being 
disproportionate in relation to the size of the undertaking’.136  This ceiling can, however, be 
bypassed. Antitrust practitioners are familiar with the Commission’s tactic that consists in 
bringing mother companies within the calculation of the total turnover, as a means to elevate the 
10 per cent cap.137  
In addition to this, the Commission has put in place several escape or discount routes for 
antitrust fines in cartel cases. The leniency programme is a case in point.  Under this instrument, 
cartel participants who blow the whistle can expect to obtain fine immunities and reductions, 
depending on how expediently they report unlawful activity and on the added value brought by 
their submissions. Moreover, the Commission can enter into settlements with cartel participants 
who concede to be guilty during the investigation.138 The settling firms can receive a 10 per cent 
reduction in return for settling.139 Lastly, in ‘exceptional circumstances’, the Commission can 
reduce or squash the fine if the sanctioned firm faces economic hardship. 140  In the period 
between 2007 and March 2015, such requests became more frequent with the financial crisis but 
out of 43 requests, only 13 have been accepted, suggesting a low success rate.141 
                                                     
135 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty,OJ (2003) L 001, P. 0001 – 0025, Article 23 (2) al. 2-3, Article 23 (4), 
al. 5. 
136 See Case C-100 to 103/80, SA Musique Diffusion française contre Commission, ECR [1983] -01825, para. 119. 
137 See A. Montesa, and A. Givaja, ‘When Parents Pay for their Children´s Wrongs: Attribution of Liability for EC 
Antitrust Infringements in Parent-Subsidiary Scenarios’ (2006) 29 World Competition 555-574. 
138 Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2003 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the 
Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, OJ (2004) L 123, at 18, as amended by Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 622/2008 of 30 June 2008, OJ (2008) L 171, at 3. Commission Notice on the conduct of 
settlement procedures in view of the adoption of Decisions pursuant to Articles 7 and 23 of Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1/2003 in cartel cases (Text with EEA relevance), OJ (2008) C 167, at 1–6. 
139 See F. Laina and E. Laurinen, ‘The EU Cartel Settlement Procedure: Current Status and Challenges’ (2013) 4 (4), 
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 302-311. 
140 See Guidelines on the method of setting fines (n 120), para. 35: ‘In exceptional cases, the Commission may, upon 
request, take account of the undertaking's inability to pay in a specific social and economic context.’  This will be the 
case if the fine ‘irretrievably jeopardise the economic viability of the undertaking concerned and cause its assets to 
lose all their value’. 
141 T. Toft (European Commission), Fines setting by the European Commission for Antitrust Infringements, 19 March 2015, 
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To close this presentation, let us mention Article 23(2) of the Regulation. This provision 
prescribes that fines of a similar magnitude can be applied to firms that contravene a decision, 
ordering interim measures or to firms that do not comply with the terms of a commitment 
previously entered by the Commission.  This was illustrated in 2013 when Microsoft was found 
in breach a previous commitment that it would offer users to choose amongst competing 
Internet browsers in Windows.142 The Commission fined Microsoft a total of €561 million. 
 
C. Fines for Procedural Infringements 
The Commission can also inflict fines for lack of cooperation in the context of antitrust 
investigations; that is, all investigative measures taken by the Commission, from mere requests 
for information to interviews, on the spot investigations at firms’ premises and documentary 
seizures.143  Article 23(1) of the Regulation entitles the Commission to inflict fines on firms that, 
amongst other things, supply incorrect, incomplete, misleading or belated information. Those 
fines cannot exceed 1 per cent of the total turnover of the sanctioned firm in the preceding 
business year. There are no guidelines governing their calculations, though some rare cases offer 
hints of guidance. In a case well-known from antitrust practitioners, the Commission imposed a 
€38 million fine on the German energy supplier E.ON, on the ground that employees had 
tampered with a seal affixed by the Commission during a dawn raid.144 On appeal, the EU courts 
confirmed the wide margin of discretion of the Commission in setting such fines. Since then, 
more fines were imposed in similar cases.145 
                                                                                                                                                                     
available online: http://www.euchinacomp.org/attachments/article/467/EN/2015-03-19_TT_Fines.pdf  
142 Commission Decision of 6 March 2013, Case AT.39530 – Microsoft (Tying). 
143 See Articles 17 to 22 of Regulation (n 5). 
144 See Case COMP/39.326 – E.ON Energie AG. On the legal basis and consequences for breaching the seal see 
paras. 104-112. The fine represented 0.14 per cent of its annual turnover (para. 113).  
145 See Commission decision of 24 May 2011 in Case COMP/39.796 – Suez Environment breach of seal, €8 million 
(para. 105). 
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At their heart, those fines seek to prompt firm compliance with agency requests for 
information and inspections. Interestingly, however, the CJEU has considered that such fines 
pursue a deterrence objective too. While it is true that they seek primarily to deter firms from 
resisting to investigations, the Court seems to believe that they contribute to the sort of 
substantive deterrence of consumer harm that was discussed previously. In E.ON v Commission, 
the CJEU noted that fines for procedural infringements had to be set high because a firm that 
breaches a seal can remove incriminating documents from the investigation, and this ultimately 
risks lowering the fine that may otherwise be inflicted.146   
 
D. Periodic Penalty Payments 
The Commission also has the power to inflict periodic penalty payments to compel firms to 
obey. This can for instance occur when a firm fails to implement a remedial order or to respond 
to a request for information. Article 24 of the Regulation caps those payments to 5 per cent of 
the average daily turnover in the preceding business year per day. Like fines for procedural 
infringements, periodic penalty payments do not seek primarily to deter, but instead to generate 
compliance.  
The Microsoft case gives a graphic illustration of periodic penalty payments in antitrust 
cases.147 The Commission had ordered Microsoft to share interoperability information with rivals. 
Microsoft had 120 days to design a licensing framework but for reasons not entirely under its 
control, Microsoft failed to meet this deadline. The Commission inflicted a €2 million fine on 
                                                     
146  See Case C-89/11 P, E.ON Energie AG v Commission, ECR [2012] -00000, para. 132: ‘[...] in the case of an 
infringement of the substantive rules laid down in Articles 81 and 82 EC, the Commission can impose a fine of up to 
10 per cent of the total turnover of the undertaking concerned in the preceding business year. Therefore, an 
undertaking which hinders the Commission’s inspections, by breaking seals affixed by the Commission to preserve 
the integrity of documents during the period of time necessary for the inspection, could, by removing the evidence 
gathered by the Commission, escape such a penalty and must therefore be dissuaded, by the amount of the fine set in 
accordance with Article 23(1) of Regulation 1/2003, from engaging in such behavior’. 
147 See Decision 2007/53/EC, Case COMP/C-3/37.792 — Microsoft, OJ (2007) L 32, p. 23. For previous cases, see 
also, Commission Decision 14 December 1972, Case IV/26.911 - ZOJA/CSC – ICI, OJ (1972) L 299, p. 51–58.  
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Microsoft per day of non-compliance. It took approximately two years to Microsoft to comply.  
The Commission eventually collected €899 million from the software giant. 
On appeal, the GC sought, like in E.ON v Commission, to bridge periodic penalty payments 
to fines for substantive infringements.148 It noted that both fines and periodic payments occur in 
the same set of circumstances, i.e. they are subsequent to (i) a finding of substantive infringement; 
(ii) a cease and desist order; and (iii) a behavioural remedy. The GC statement, however, is 
dubious. Competition fines can be inflicted as soon as an infringement is found, absent a cease a 
desist order (for instance, if conduct has ceased in the past) and/or a behavioural remedy. This 
does not seems to be the case of a periodic penalty payment, which can only be issued if the 
decision enshrines a ‘do/not do’ order.   
A similarly disputable logic can be found in the GC statement to the effect that ‘fine and a 
periodic penalty payment both relate to the conduct of an undertaking as revealed in the past and 
both of them require a deterrent effect in order to prevent repetition or continuation of the 
infringement’. 149  The idea that periodic penalty payments seek to prevent repetition or 
continuation of the infringement, again, cannot be true. If this was the case, periodic penalty 
payments should be pronounced in all antitrust infringement cases, which they do not seem to 
be. What those two remarks show is a commitment to expand the language of deterrence 
everywhere in competition law, even when the case for this is not entirely compelling. 
 
E. Summation  
The outline above shows at least two important findings. First, the deterrence objective permeates 
all the types of fines that can be inflicted by the Commission. The fact that the deterrence 
                                                     
148 GC, Microsoft Corp. v Commission, T-167/08, ECR [2012] 00000.  
149 Id. para. 94. 
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objective has been imported to procedural fines and periodic penalty payments, though those 
instruments do not seem initially designed to achieve deterrence, is evidence thereof.  
Second, the Court seems to use deterrence as an objective to justify the escalation of fines 
and the large discretion of the Commission in antitrust cases.  Perhaps the best proof of this lies 
in the fact that Commission has developed a variety of deterrence-spirited doctrines, which have 
been litigated before the EU courts and the EU judicature has consistently backed the 
Commission’s interpretations.150 Those judicially-endorsed deterrence doctrines include: (i) the 
reliance of the Commission on the presence of mother companies as a means to inflate the 
maximum amount of the fine (under the so-called ‘parental liability’ doctrine); 151 the 
Commission’s policy of affirming liability for fines vis-à-vis firms that acquire previous infringers 
of competition law;152 the hotly debated theory of infringement by complicity, which fines firms 
such as consulting and audit companies who assist others in a competition infringement, even 
though they are not active in the market;153 the policy of including captive sales within vertically 
integrated firms in the calculation of fines; 154  and the absence of consideration of internal 
company-compliance programmes as a mitigating circumstance in fines set for competition 
infringements.155  
All those doctrines de facto lead to increased fines or to the dismissal of mitigation causes.156  
And their common thread is that they are reasoned in deterrence terms.  For instance, in the 
                                                     
150 See, I. Forrester, ‘A challenge for Europe’s Judges: the review of fines in competition cases’ (2011) 36 European 
Law Review 202. 
151 Case C‑97/08 P Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission [2009] ECR I‑8237, para. 58. See also, T-85/06, General 
Química and Others v Commission [2008] ECR II-00338 and Case C‑521/09 P, Elf Aquitaine SA v Commission, nyr.  
152 Case IV/31.865 - PVC [1994], OJ (1994) L 239, para. 41 ‘Where the infringing undertaking itself is absorbed by 
another producer, its responsibility may follow it and attach to the new or merged entity.’ 
153 Case C-194/14 P, AC-Treuhand AG v Commission, (nyr.) 
154A Winckler, F.C. Laprévote, ‘Selected Issues raised by recent cartel decisions’, Competition Policy International, 
2013, available at: https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Uploads/EUNovember.pdf  
155 D. Geradin, ‘Antitrust Compliance Programmes & Optimal Antitrust Enforcement: A Reply to Wouter Wils’ 
(2013) 1 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 325. 
156 With the possible rejuvenation of the inability to pay doctrine amidst the economic crisis of the late 2000s, but 
this is more of contextual evolution. 
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complicity case AC Treuhand, the CJEU justified the imposition of a fine on the accomplice 
nothing that the contrary interpretation: 157  
would be liable to negate the full effectiveness of the prohibition laid 
down by that provision, in so far as such an interpretation would mean 
that it would not be possible to put a stop to the active contribution of 
an undertaking to a restriction of competition simply because that 
contribution does not relate to an economic activity forming part of the 
relevant market on which that restriction comes about or is intended to 
come about. 
In this context, antitrust practitioners often claim that judicial review discharged by the EU 
courts is deficient, relying on the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) in voicing 
their concern. Indeed, in a 2012 Menarini ruling, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
held that Article 6 of the Convention requires that decisions from administrative agencies that 
inflict fines are amenable to challenge before a court with full jurisdiction. The ECtHR defined 
full jurisdiction as the ability to re-craft entirely the administrative decision, in light of all facts 
and legal arguments.158 The Court reasoned that administrative fines are of a criminal nature 
when they aim at punishing an infringement and at deterring future fines, and provided a certain 
level is met.159 In KME v. Commission, however, the ECJ closed the debate. Leaving open the 
question whether antitrust fines are criminal, it considered that the EU system was at any rate 
Article 6(1) compliant.160 The Court made short shrift of the argument noting that:  
The review provided for by the Treaties thus involves review by the 
Courts of the European Union of both the law and the facts, and means 
that they have the power to assess the evidence, to annul the contested 
decision and to alter the amount of a fine. The review of legality provided 
for under Article 263 TFEU, supplemented by the unlimited jurisdiction 
                                                     
157 AC-Treuhand AG v Commission (n 153). 
158 ECtHR, A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. c. Italie, Requête no 43509/08), 27 September 2011, para. 57. See M. 
Bronckers and A. Vallery, ‘Business as usual after Menarini?’ (2012) 3(1) Mlex Magazine 44-47, D Waelbroeck, 
‘L’Impact de la CEDH sur les Procédures en Droit de la Concurrence’ (presentation at the Université Libre de 
Bruxelles on 24 April 2012).  
159 ECtHR, Menarini , ibid, para. 42. 
160 The Court states at para. 133 that: ‘The review provided for by the Treaties thus involves review by the Courts of 
the European Union of both the law and the facts, and means that they have the power to assess the evidence, to 
annul the contested decision and to alter the amount of a fine. The review of legality provided for under Article 
263 TFEU, supplemented by the unlimited jurisdiction in respect of the amount of the fine, provided for under 
Article 31 of Regulation No 1/2003, is not therefore contrary to the requirements of the principle of effective 
judicial protection in Article 47 of the Charter’., 
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in respect of the amount of the fine, provided for under Article 31 of 
Regulation No 1/2003, is not therefore contrary to the requirements of 
the principle of effective judicial protection in Article 47 of the Charter. 
 
This sort of reasoning is an ‘intellectual somersault’.161 It is akin to saying that there cannot 
be inefficient judicial review in practice because the text of the Treaty says the contrary. This, 
clearly, cannot be in line with the requirements of the rule of law. In Telefonica, AG Wathelet 
exhorted the ECJ to set a higher standard of judicial review in relation to fines.162 The Court, 
however, left the proposition unacknowledged.  
 
4. Two-Tier Deterrence Hypothesis 
A possible method to understand how the EU deters the State, on the one hand, and firms on 
the other, is to approach our above findings from three distinct angles (see Table 1): purpose of 
fines imposed (functional angle); method followed to set and liquidate the penalty (operational angle); 
and procedure for the imposition of fines (procedural angle). 
 
A. Functional Angle 
It is by now apparent that the penalties inflicted to States in EU environmental law and to firms 
in EU competition law pursue distinct aims. With the exception of lump sums payments, 
environmental penalties essentially seek to prompt the State to comply and put an end to an on-
going infringement, while competition penalties mainly purport to deter firms from future 
infringements. This has led to two distinct systems of deterrence – soft and hard – being applied 
to the State versus the firm, which can be observed at several levels.   
                                                     
161  Antitrust and Privilege, An EU court restricts attorney-client confidentiality, Sept. 16, 2010, available at: 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703376504575491603119775806  
162 Opinion AG Wathelet, 26 September 2013, Telefónica SA and Telefónica de España SAU v European Commission, Case 
C-295/12 P., paras. 125-129. 
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First, in environmental law, periodic penalties and fines for non-communication are not 
inflicted when the State terminates the infringement during the proceedings. This, on the other 
hand, is immaterial in competition cases, and firms are sanctioned even if they have terminated 
the infringement during the proceedings.   
Second, whilst the periodic penalty payments inflicted in competition cases are primarily 
designed to force a firm to comply with a Commission decision, the case law seem to see them as 
a deterrence device, as can be seen from the Microsoft judgment. This interpretation is similar to 
the one found in the Commission’s guidelines on sanctions under Article 260(2) TFEU. 
However, where things diverge is in relation to the practical admissibility of cooperation related 
defences. In environmental law cases, the case law tends to accommodate arguments to the effect 
that the infringing State has exhibited a degree of bone fide cooperation. In contrast, in 
competition law, those arguments were given short shrift. Perhaps the sole analogy is inability to 
pay and the economic state of the Member State, though it is clear in competition law that 
inability to pay applications are rarely successful.  
Third, even in those areas where deterrence infiltrates environmental law, the concept 
applied is one of specific deterrence. The idea is to deter the State that breaches EU law from 
present and future infringements, and only this State. This can be seen in Commission v Italy, where 
recidivism was taken into account.163 In contrast, the policy that permeates competition law is 
both of specific and general deterrence. The idea is certainly to deter the firm under investigation 
but also to deter all other firms in the economy. This is clear from both the case law and the 
Guidelines on the method of setting fines. 
Fourth, a discussion has taken place in competition law in relation to the compliance 
programmes internally designed by firms to reduce risks of antitrust infringements.164 Firms have 
                                                     
163 Or the re-occurence of infringments, see Commission v Italy (n 27) para. 86.  
164 W., Wils, ‘Antitrust Compliance Programmes & Optimal Antitrust Enforcement’ (2013) 1 Journal of Antitrust 
Enforcement 52, Geradin, ‘A Reply to Wouter Wils’ (n 155).  
 36
sought to advocate that the setting up of compliance programmes should lead to fines reductions 
in the form of mitigating circumstances. Thus far, the CJEU has refused to consider fines 
reductions to firms with a compliance programme.165  
The Commission has similarly been reluctant to take compliance efforts into regard in 
calculating fines imposed on firms. In a decision of 2013, the Commission noticed that Microsoft 
had not complied with a previous decision ordering the setting up of a choice screen of Internet 
browsers on Windows for PC. The Commission proceeded to inflict fines for non-compliance. 
Microsoft advanced that it had taken various steps to address compliance problems, and prevent 
their repetition in the future. It had, in particular, created a new function of Antitrust Compliance 
Officer.166  The Commission noted that while they were ‘important’, it was under ‘no duty … to 
reduce the fine’ and that it was at any rate ‘impossible to determine the effectiveness of the 
internal measures taken by Microsoft to prevent future non-compliance’.167 
To some extent, and in some cases, the compliance efforts undertaken by firms have even 
been interpreted as aggravating factors in past case law.168 Even though the Commission has 
expressed in its compliance brochure that this would no longer be the case,169 the Microsoft 
decision indirectly hints at this outcome. In this decision, the Commission suggested that 
Microsoft’s ‘significant competition law expertise’ had the effect of lowering the threshold for 
negligence or of raising the threshold for excusability.170 
                                                     
165  The Court held in Hercules: ‘whilst it is indeed important that the applicant took steps to prevent fresh 
infringements […], that circumstance does not alter the fact that an infringement has been found to have been 
committed in the present case.’ (T-7/89 SA Hercules Chemicals NV v. Commission, RC [1991] II-01711, paras. 354-
357.).  See, similarly, Compliance matters – brochure by the EU Commission, edition 2012, 20-21, available at: 
http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/compliance-matters-pbKD3211985/: ‘the mere existence of a compliance 
programme will not be considered as an attenuating circumstance. Nor will the setting-up of a compliance 
programme be considered as a valid argument justifying a reduction of the fine in the wake of investigation of an 
infringement.’ 
166 Decision, Case COMP/39.530, Microsoft - Tying, para. 36. 
167 Ibid. para. 73. 
168 See Commission Decision 14 October 1998, IV/F-3/33.708 (British Sugar II). 
169 See Compliance matters – brochure by the EU Commission, edition 2012, p.21: ‘It goes without saying that the 
existence of a compliance programme will not be considered an aggravating circumstance. 
170 Decision, COMP, AT.39.530, Microsoft-Tying, paras. 49 and 69. 
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This further shows that cooperation does not constitute a key driver of the fining policy in 
competition law, in much contrast with environmental law, where concrete, cooperative steps 
that the Member States may have are favourably included in the Court’s calculation. 
Environmental policy seems thus to gravitate around a soft deterrence paradigm, driven by the 
ambition to promote cooperation between the Commission and the State specifically infringing 
the duty to transpose. The logic of competition law seems in contrast to be one of hard 
deterrence that seeks to ensure prevention of anticompetitive harm through the sending of 
general signals to the entire economy. This gives currency to the idea that deterrence is soft 
against the State and hard against the firm. 
 
B. Operational Angle 
Given the limited experience of fines against States under Article 260 TFEU, it is impossible to 
benchmark them with the level of fines inflicted on firms in competition law. Instead, a better 
approach is to discuss the general principles that underpin the quantum of the fines imposed in 
both disciplines. In this respect, a marked difference between environmental and competition 
penalties lies in the methodology followed to set fines. Whilst an objective and transparent 
algebraic equation governs the calculation of fines in competition proceedings, a much more 
abstract and discretionary methodology seems to apply to environmental fines.  
The reason that explains the discrepancy between the scientific approach applied in 
competition proceedings and the impressionistic one followed in environmental law may hinge 
on the former’s greater permeability to deterrence theory, which teaches that fines must be set on 
explicit criteria, so that profit maximizing criminals understand that the costs of infringement 
exceed by some tractable margin their benefits. We explore this possibility later. What the case 
law above, nevertheless, shows is that environmental jurisprudence is erratic not necessarily 
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because the Court enjoys broad discretion in calculating the fines but because it fails to 
rationalize its methodology in fixing them.171 Ultimately, this raises serious issues regarding the 
appropriate level of deterrence, as well as warnings of fading legal certainty.172 
A second, unnoticed difference is that the liquidation of fines in environmental and in 
competition law cases, though it is subject to the same principles, has drastically distinct 
consequences. To understand this, a detour through Article 311 TFEU is necessary. This article 
governs the ‘Union’s own resources’, which are primarily financed by yearly fixed instalments 
paid by the Member States.173 Given that the fines inflicted by the EU institutions come on top 
of this, as a rule, the Treaty mandates that this surplus should be discounted from the Member 
States yearly instalments.174 This applies to fines issued under competition law, as well as to 
penalties inflicted to the Member States under Article 260 TFEU. The implication thereof is 
remarkable: when Member States breach their duty to transpose, they make payments that 
subsequently revolve back to them through the Article 311 TFEU mechanism. When firms 
breach their duty to compete, on the other hand, they do not enjoy such a monetary return. Even 
if we were to assume equal severity in payments between State and firm, the level of deterrence 
achieved vis-à-vis both of them would be significantly higher for the firm. 
 
C. Procedural Angle 
                                                     
171 A. Kornezov, 'Imposing the Right Amount of Sanctions under Article 260(2) TFEU: Fairness v Predictability, or 
How to "Bridge the Gaps"' (2014) 20 Colombia Journal of European Law 283, 284.  
172 Lees makes a similar point but in relation to legal certainty for operators covered by a set of environmental 
directives, see  E. Lees, Interpreting Environmental Offences: The Need for Certainty (Hart Publishing/Bloomsbury 2015).  
173 2014/335/EU, Euratom: Council Decision of 26 May 2014 on the system of own resources of the European 
Union OJ (2014) L 168, p. 105–111. 
174 See Article 83 of the Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council 
Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 OJ (2012) L 298, p. 1–96. According to the Financial Reports of the 
Commission, in 2012, €3.5 billion was recorded as income from fines, representing about 2.6 per cent of the 
EU budget in 2012. In 2013, this figured raised to a total amount of €2.9 billion, which represented about 2.2 per 
cent of the EU budget for that year. The trend continues, and in 2014 fines worth a total of €4.5 billion represented 
around 3.2 per cent of the EU budget in 2014. 
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The procedural setting to which States and firms are subject in environmental and competition 
proceedings are radically different. In environmental law, fines can only be set following judicial 
proceedings before the CJEU. This can be called an adjudication model. Moreover, with the 
exception of fines for non-communication, two rounds of proceedings before the CJEU – first, 
under Article 258 TFEU and then under Article 260 TFEU – are necessary before a fine is 
inflicted against a State. In contrast, in EU competition law, fines can be set by the Commission 
in the first place. Court’s proceedings are not needed. That can be called a self-executing model. 
What is more, the introduction of review proceedings before the CJEU has no suspensive effect 
on the fines set by the Commission (unless the applicant requests interim measures). Importantly, 
this is even true in respect of periodic penalty payments, which is the fining instrument that 
comes closest to those found in environmental law. The Commission can set periodic penalty 
payments without requesting prior CJEU approval.  
This dual procedural setting is also a factor that influences the degree of deterrence 
achieved by the two policies.  The threat of punishment is more credible when the enforcement 
structure follows a self-executing model than when it follows an adjudication model.  This threat 
is even exacerbated by the fact that when fines or periodic penalty payments are appealed on the 
basis of Article 261 TFEU, the Court has unlimited jurisdiction to cancel them, but also decrease 
or increase them. 
Deterrence  State Firm  
Functionality Angle Ending a specific breach  
 
Deterring from anticompetitive behaviour 
specifically and generally  
Operational Angle Wide ECJ discretion  Wide Commission discretion  
Procedural Angle Pre-approval by the ECJ either in-
two or one round of legal 
proceedings (adjudication model) 
Commission’s fining with immediate 




5. Deterrence Theory  
The two-tier soft versus hard deterrence regime found in EU law can be looked at through the 
lenses of deterrence theory.  Gary Becker, a Nobel Prize economist, provided in a 1968 paper a 
commonly used theoretical framework for deterrence. At its heart, Becker’s work tried to answer 
the following normative question: ‘how many resources and how much punishment should be 
used to enforce different kinds of legislation’.175 Becker posits that crime is an ‘economic activity’, 
and that a rational economic agent commits an offense if the expected utility to him exceeds the 
utility he could get by using his time and other resources at other activities. In contrast, Becker 
predicts compliance if the benefit acquired from law-abidance exceeds penalties for non-
compliance.176 This calculation in turn is a function of the probability of conviction (p), and of 
the size of the punishment if convicted (f), and Becker shows that criminals are often more 
sensitive to a change in (p) than (f).177 Two points based on a closer literature review on this topic 
are necessary to set out in this article.  
First, in spite of its links with the traditional utilitarian concept of punishment, developed 
by early classical philosophers like Beccaria, Bentham and More178 and of the considerable body 
of research devoted to deterrence theory by modern economists,179 deterrence remains unpopular 
                                                     
175 G. Becker, 'Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach' (n 10). This is not to overlook earlier ‘economically 
oriented’ writings on public enforcement by Montesquieu, Beccaria and Bentham. For a brief overview thereof see 
e.g. M. Polinsky and S. Shavell, 'The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law' in Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell 
(eds), Handbook of Law and Economics, vol 1 (Elsevier 2007) 403, 405.  
176 C. Rechtschaffen, 'Deterrence vs. cooperation and the evolving theory of environmental enforcement' (1998) 71 
Southern California Law Review 1181, 1186.  
177 See e.g. M. Polinsky and S. Shavell, 'The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law' (2000) 38 Journal of 
Economic Literature 45. 
178 See Stigler’s Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement in Thomas More’s Utopia, suggested by G. Weyl in (2011) 119 
Journal of Political Economy, citing Thomas More in reference to Stigler’s work: ‘I think putting thieves to death is not 
lawful; and it is plain and obvious that it is absurd, and of ill-consequence to the commonwealth, that a thief and a 
murderer should be equally punished; for if a robber sees that his danger is the same, if he is convicted of theft as if 
he were guilty of murder, this will naturally incite him to kill the person whom otherwise he would only have robbed, 
since if the punishment is the same, there is more security, and less danger of discovery, when he that can best make 
it is put out of the way; so that terrifying thieves too much, provokes them to cruelty. [Sir Thomas More, Utopia, bk. 
I]’ 
179 See G Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Law, in Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, G. S. 
Becker and W. M. Landes, eds., NBER, 1974. 
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with lawyers and policymakers.180 The reasons for this are manifold. One is that deterrence is not 
all that matters, and that additional non-consequentialist considerations like fairness, 
compensation and vengeance might come into play when enforcing the law.181 Another is that 
deterrence is deeply conditioned on rational choice assumptions, and that this fails to take into 
account the bounded rationality hypothesis, and in particular that non-compliance may be the 
result of, for instance, rational ignorance.182 Moreover, there is no consensus within the economic 
literature on how deterrence ought to be calculated or according to which methods.183  
Some of those causes, much less all of them, may provide explanation for the relatively soft 
penetration of deterrence philosophy in EU environmental law. For instance, lack of resources 
and expertise was found to be an explanatory factor for poor implementation of EU 
environmental law in the Member States.184 Moreover, much of the current regulatory debates in 
environmental law look beyond ‘orthodox deterrence theory’ 185  in discussing enforcement 
mechanisms. The prevailing cooperative-oriented approach instead attempts to create 
enforcement structures that appeal to interests beyond that of mere profit-maximization in 
securing compliance.186 This is not to say that deterrence is irrelevant in the literature – it is 
                                                     
180 Veljanovski, Economic Principles of Law (n 11) 12.  
181  See L. Kaplow and S. Shavell, ‘Fairness versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, and 
Distributive Justice’, Journal of Legal Studies 32 (January 2003). 
182 J. Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration (Cambridge University Press 1989).   
183 On the question of optimal deterrence, see A. Mitchell Polinsky and S. Shavell, ‘Puntitive Damages: An Economic 
Analysis’ (1999) 111 Harvard Law Review 869. Cf. C. Sunstein, D. Schkade and D. Kahneman, ‘Do People Want 
Optimal Deterrence?’ (1999) John Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 77. On a discussion on 
whether deterrence or e.g. compensation ought to be regulatory goals, see D. Epple and M. Visscher, 'Environmental 
Pollution: modeling occurence, detection and deterrence' (1984) 27 Journal of Law and Economics 29, 56-57. On a 
debate on what type of sanctions to enforce, see Ogus, who finds regulatory scenarios where hassle and 
inconvenience works better than financial sanctions to achieve compliance, see A. Ogus, 'Regulatory Sanctions, 
Wheel-Clamping and Hassle' in Erik Rosaeg, Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Endre Stavang (eds), Law and Economics 
(Cappelen Academisk 2010) 127. Moreover, there is no consensus on whether deterrence ‘works’. Peers raises this 
point with regard to Article 260(2) TFEU and how the Commission has yet to complete a review on its effectiveness 
as a general deterrent (here meaning, ending the particular breaches of EU law sanctioned by the Court), see S. Peers, 
'Sanctions for Infringement of EU Law after the Treaty of Lisbon' (2012) 18 European Public Law 33, 57. 
184  IMPEL, Final Report 23 March 2015, available at http://impel.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Implementation-Challenge-Report-23-March-2015.pdf. Note that also low level of fines 
was part of the explanation for non-compliance.  
185  A. Ogus and C. Abbot, ‘Sanctions for pollution’ (n 105) 283.  
186 See n. 3.   
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simply not considered to be the whole and sole solution to enforcement.187 What is crucial to 
note here is that national enforcement reports, as well as surveys of legislative designs for 
effective enforcement, all point to low fines as the root cause of under-deterrence and non-
compliance.188 The need for dissuasive penalties for environmentally harmful activities was also 
made clear by introducing Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the environment through 
criminal law.189 Most of those findings, nevertheless, concern deterrence measures available to the 
Member State vis-à-vis firms – not deterrence against the State. 
In contrast, the objections levelled at deterrence theory have seemingly had less impact on 
competition law, owing possibly to the widespread acceptance, both at theoretical and 
methodological levels, of the rational choice hypothesis in this field of the law. In this regard, the 
firm, which is the main addressee of the competition rules, is widely seen, in the case law, as a 
profit maximizing entity, that decides on whether to breach the duty to compete on grounds of 
cost-benefit analysis. To be sure, some discussions remain. For instance, some propose to set 
optimal fines at the level of victims’ loss so as to avoid the deterrence of efficient infringements 
when the perpetrators gain are superior. 190  At the epistemological level, the penetration of 
optimal enforcement literature in antitrust is also not surprising considering that a number of 
scholars who pioneered works on deterrence were also active antitrust academics.191 
                                                     
187 For example, deterrence is part of Ayres and Braithwaite’s enforcement pyramid, ibid. 
188 See e.g. R. Macrory, Regulatory Justice: Sanctioning in a post-Hampton World (Cabinet Office , May 2006) (Macrory 
Report), and reflected upon in R. Macrory, ‘New approaches to regulatory sanctions’ (2008) 20 ELM 210. Support 
for sanctions is similar found in E. Scotford and J. Robinson, ‘Legislative design for effective enforcement of 
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190 R. Posner, Antitrust Law (2nd ed. University of Chicago Press 2001) Chapter 10.  
191 G.J. Stigler, ‘The Optimum Enforcement of Laws.’ (May/June, 1970) 78 Journal of Political Economy 526-36; R. A. 
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Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring Information About Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions’ 
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Another possible explanatory factor for the fact that deterrence vis-à-vis the State is 
neglected 192  has to do with the fact that legal scholarship may be more concerned with 
deliberating substantive law options, as opposed to law enforcement issues,193 all the more so in 
areas like environmental law where the substantive rules are often taught of as less mature in age 
and constitutional in status than well-established legal disciplines, such as competition law.194 Our 
view is that the explanation lies elsewhere.  
In essence, it is that the State is widely perceived to be a social organisation that is 
unresponsive to economic incentives and that it therefore falls through the cracks of rational 
choice doctrines to which deterrence theory belongs. We argue, however, that this viewpoint 
deserves discussion. As previously noted, the State can be, as Coase once pointed out, 
characterised as a super firm, and accordingly, it should be responsive, to a certain extent, to 
similar incentives and constraints.195 
On closer analysis, the idea that deterrence theory does not apply to the State, or not 
entirely, seems to rest on one main assumption: that States enjoy a taxation and regulation 
monopoly so that their resources are infinitely more abundant than those of firms. As is well 
known, a State can indeed ultimately resort to taxation and regulation to increase its 
appropriation of society’s resources.196 This system, as Acemoglu and Robinson explain, is based 
on the Weberian view that States shall be given this monopoly of violence in order to avert, what 
                                                     
192 With some exceptions: C. Rechtschaffen and D. Markell, Reinventing Environmental Enforcement & the State/Federal 
Relationship (Environmental Law Institute 2003), where, however, the focus is on issues concerning competence as 
opposed to per se deterring the State. 
193 N. Gunningham, 'Enforcing Environmental Regulation' (n 3) 171.  
194 E. Fisher and others, 'Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about Environmental Law Scholarship' (2009) 
21 Journal of Environmental Law 213. Note, however, that Fisher and others do not compare environmental law 
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195 For another analogy, see S. Kan and C.S. Hwang, ‘A Form of Government Organization from the Perspective of 
Transaction Cost Economics’ (1996) 7 Constitutional Political Economy, 197-219, who look at ‘what would be the 
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196 G. Brennan and J. M. Buchanan, The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution’ (Indianapolis, 2000), 
available at; http://www.econlib.org/library/Buchanan/buchCv9c4.html;  
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Thomas Hobbes described, ‘a war of all against all’, also known as the state of nature.197 As a 
result of this Weberian monopoly, the ‘elasticity of response’ of a State to a change in 
punishment, be it in terms of (p) or (f), is necessarily more limited than the elasticity of a firm. 
Put more prosaically, a similar change in penalties should yield less deterrence effects vis-à-vis the 
State than vis-à-vis the firm. This problem is further compounded by the fact that, as mentioned 
at the outset of this article, unlike a firm, the State is a social organization that is not subject to 
the process of competition, which fosters incentives for spontaneous compliance. Whilst a fined 
firm may be sanctioned by its shareholders and customers, who will relocate their resources from 
it towards rivals, the State is a centralized entity that cannot be as easily avoided by taxpayers.  
There is, however, a limitation to the ability of States to evade the deterrent effect of 
financial penalties. A State power to tax and regulate is limited by accountability before the public 
opinion. In turn, if State governance works well, financial penalties should deter, at least to some 
extent, States’ infringements of the law.  
This ideal world, however, fail to take account of one major agency problem that is said to 
inherently limit deterrence vis-à-vis the State.198 The literature advances that the penalty inflicted 
to the State, and the incentives it conveys, might never be delegated down to the individual 
official responsible of the infringement of the law, thereby failing to induce agents to internalise 
the costs of their illegal behaviour.199 This argument, however, fails for a number of reasons.  
First, the question of whether incentives are transferred from the organisation to its agent 
is not peculiar to the State but exists in many vertical organisations also subject to agency 
problems like firms. In fact, if one were to follow this claim, then the idea of deterring firm 
should be abandoned altogether. Moreover, States are less prone to timing distortions than firms. 
                                                     
197 D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty (New York: Crown 
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As is well known, workers’ mobility is less important in the public than in the private sector due 
to rigid dismissal rules. Accordingly, while in a firm, it may be impossible to channel down the 
penalty to the responsible individual if he or she has left the organisation, this risk is less acute in 
a public administration. Last, whilst it is true that public administrations have rigid labour rules, 
and may be less likely to adjust individual officials’ benefits in response to a breach of the duty to 
transpose, it is equally true that many OECD countries are reported to introduce performance 
approaches in all areas of public administration.200 This evolution is likely to make it increasingly 
possible to channel down liability towards the responsible individual and, beyond this, deter 
unlawful behaviour at decentralised levels. With all this, the mainstream view whereby a State 
would, unlike a firm, be predominantly insensitive to penalties deserves to be re-qualified.   
Additionally, this view does not imply by necessity that a soft deterrence policy shall 
prevail. The State inelasticity to penalties may not be linear (i.e. equal at all levels) and at higher 
fines levels, Governments might be more elastic to penalties. If the frequencies and magnitude of 
fining were intensified and moved to shocking levels for the public opinion, more accountability 
from the Government could arguably be expected. Beyond action on the magnitude of penalties, 
it is also well known that the public opinion is sensitive to statistics and numbers, so that a more 
objective, quantified and transparent penalties policy against the State may also improve State 
deterrence.201 Last, a number of exogenous factors, like the economic context, may make States 
more sensitive to penalties than generally assumed. In particular, State elasticity to penalties may 
be particularly important in contexts of fiscal austerity and limited budgetary manoeuvre to raise 
taxes. In sum, the idea that a State cannot be deterred through financial penalties is probably 
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overstated, and there is a plausible claim to make that a harder, or at least more explicit and 
structured, deterrence policy can yield some effects on States.   
 
6. Conclusion 
In this article we have examined the relevant environmental and competition legal frameworks to 
show the existence of a two-tier deterrence regime, depending on whether the State or the firm is 
the addressee of the legal duty under EU law. A salient trait of this divide is that deterrence 
imposed on the State is soft and patterned according to the adjudication model where the Court 
is predominant, whereas deterrence imposed on the firm, on the other hand, is hard and relies on 
a self-executing model that lends the Commission broader discretion in determining and 
enforcing sanctions.  
We acknowledge that a wealth of explanatory forces underlie the two-tier deterrence 
hypothesis, many, which are left unexplored in this study. One such reason is certainly the EU’s 
institutional design. Because legislative power in the EU context is exercised by the Member 
States through their representatives in the Council,202 it is assumed that the State will abide by the 
law they have collectively produced so that deterrence seems less relevant.203 Another reason may 
be that key public policies – here, environmental protection and competition – are valued 
differently, which takes expression not only in soft and hard deterrence but also in the extent to 
which the Commission is entrusted with discretion, as well as manpower to enforce these.204 
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Ultimately, the extent to which the State is deterred in positive EU law may just be the by-
product of the type of federalism pursued and of the extent to which it is accepted that the EU 
can ‘commandeer’ its Member States.205 
The reader at this stage may be left with the impression that higher (or equivalent) fines 
should be imposed on the State in environmental law along the lines followed with regard to 
firms in competition law. This is certainly a straightforward prescription but it is not our 
conclusion. Instead, we suggest that some aspects of the existing soft deterrence paradigm shall 
be open to discussion. Those include responsiveness of States to economic sanctions, 
methodology used by the Commission and the Court for their determination, admissibility of 
justifications and defences, adjudication versus self-executing framework for deterrence, and 
ultimate destination of fines collected from Member States and firms.206  
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